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Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy
with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand cor-
respondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences
with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand cor-
respondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can
recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures
the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.
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Correspondence to:T .M a r i o t t i1 Introduction
We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a dynamic exchange economy
with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. At any given date,
consumers are endowed with preferences over consumption sequences. As in Strotz
[16], these preferences may change as time evolves. Following Pollak [14] and, more
recently, Laibson [7] and many others, consumption choices are determined by the
outcome of an intrapersonal game played by successive incarnations of the same
consumer. Consumers are sophisticated: they correctly anticipate future prices and
perceive how their own future behavior is aﬀected by changes in preferences.
As pointed out by Peleg and Yaari [12], such an intrapersonal game need not have
a Markov perfect equilibrium. Following Goldman [3], we therefore study subgame-
perfect equilibria. In the most general setup we consider, the strategies in this game
are allowed to include mixing, and past mixing behavior of a consumer is allowed to
aﬀect his current choices. As a result of this, the individual demand correspondences
are convex-valued. This allows for a competitive equilibrium that is symmetric in
the sense that consumers of the same type make the same (randomized) choices.
Competitive equilibria also exist in the absence of observable mixed strategies, but
individual demand correspondences are no longer convex-valued, and the competitive
equilibrium may have to be asymmetric.
One motivation for this paper is the recent work on modelling agents with time-
inconsistent preferences (Laibson [7], Harris and Laibson [5]). In Luttmer and Mar-
iotti [9], we explicitly solve for competitive equilibrium prices in a Markov perfect
equilibrium of an economy with consumers whose preferences are homothetic and
additively separable, with subjective discount factors that exhibit present bias. This
present bias is shown to be a potential source of volatility in aggregate wealth. As in
many applications, homotheticity makes the problem tractable. But without argu-
ments that show that competitive equilibria can be properly deﬁned for more general
preferences, it is not clear that one can view homotheticity as a convenient approxi-
mation. This paper takes some steps towards ﬁlling this gap. In a companion paper,
we discuss in more detail some aspects of homothetic preferences that are special
when preferences change over time (Luttmer and Mariotti [8]).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe a general class of in-
trapersonal games, and characterize the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes
with observable mixed strategies. Section 3 applies this result to derive the existence
of a competitive equilibrium in a dynamic exchange economy with consumers whose
preferences may change over time. Section 4 concludes.
2 An intrapersonal game
We describe a game that will be interpreted in Section 3 as the game played by the
incarnations of a ﬁnitely-lived price-taking consumer who can trade a single consump-
1tion good across time.
2.1 The physical environment
Our basic setup is directly in line with Harris [4]. There is a ﬁnite number of periods,
indexed by t =1 ,...,T.I ne a c hp e r i o dt =1 ,...,T, there is a single active player,
hereafter called the date-t consumer. A non-empty complete separable metric space
H0 represents the set of starting points of the game. For each t =1 ,...,T,t h ea c t i o n
of the date-t consumer is chosen from a non-empty complete separable metric space
Ct. A closed subset Ht ⊂ H0×
Qt
s=1 Cs represents the set of histories that can occur up
to and including date t. The set of actions available to the date-t consumer following
any history in Ht−1 is given by a correspondence At : Ht−1 ³ Ct that is continuous
and has non-empty and compact values. The sets of possible histories Ht are deﬁned
recursively via Ht =g r a p h At for t =1 ,...,T. For each history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1,l e t
Γt(ht−1) be the set of possible continuation histories following ht−1.O u ra s s u m p t i o n s
imply that Γt : Ht−1 ³
QT
s=t Cs is a continuous correspondence with non-empty and
compact values. For each t =1 ,...,T, the date-t consumer has expected utility
preferences represented by a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
Ut : HT → R.
2.2 Observable mixed strategies
In an intrapersonal game, it is natural to assume that the mixed action chosen by the
date-t consumer, and not only the outcome of such a mixed action, can be observed by
his successors. Observable mixed actions can be accounted for by deﬁning extended
histories. For each t =1 ,...,T, the set of date-t extended histories e Ht is given by:1
e Ht =
(






That is, a date-t extended history speciﬁes a physical history ht as well as a sequence
mt of sequentially feasible mixed actions up to and including date t. One can verify
that e Ht is closed for each t =1 ,...,T. For symmetry, we set e H0 = H0 and interpret
m0 as an empty symbol. We can now deﬁne strategies.
Deﬁnition 1 For each t =1 ,...,T, a strategy for the date-t consumer is a Borel
measurable function γt : e Ht−1 → ∆(Ct) that satisﬁes:
suppγt(·|e ht−1) ⊂ At(projHt−1e ht−1)
for each e ht−1 ∈ e Ht−1.
1The set of Borel probability measures over a complete separable metric space X is denoted by
∆(X), and is endowed with the usual weak∗ topology.
2For each h0 ∈ H0, a strategy combination γ =( γ1,...,γT) induces a probability
distribution over the set of possible histories in the subgame h0. We refer to this as
the path induced by γ in the subgame h0.
Deﬁnition 2 An intrapersonal equilibrium is a strategy combination γ such that for
each t =1 ,...,T,and each history e ht−1 ∈ e Ht−1, the date-t consumer cannot increase
his utility in the subgame e ht−1 by using a strategy other than γt.
Harris [4, Theorem 1] readily implies that an intrapersonal equilibrium exists: any
subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies can be turned into an intrapersonal
equilibrium. However, the subgame-perfect equilibrium correspondence may fail to be
convex-valued, even if mixed strategies are taken into account. To see this, consider
the two-player game of perfect information illustrated in Figure 1. It is immediate
that (U,u) and (D,d0) are subgame-perfect equilibrium paths. For Player 1 to be
indiﬀerent between U and D, it must be that Player 2 is mixing with equal probability
between u and d following U. This means that there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium
in which the equilibrium path is a lottery over (U,u) and (D,d0) only.2
–Insert Figure 1 here–
However, it is easy to implement any path in the convex hull of subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcomes if Player 2 can observe the mixed action used by Player 1.
Consider for instance the path obtained by randomizing over (U,u) and (D,d0) with
equal probabilities. A subgame-perfect equilibrium with observable mixed strategies
that implement this path is as follows. If Player 1 randomizes with equal probabilities
between U and D, then Player 2 chooses u after U and d0 after D. For any other
randomization by Player 1, Player 2 chooses d after U and d0 after D.I ti so p t i m a l
f o rP l a y e r1t or a n d o m i z ei nt h ep r e s c r i b e dw a y ,f o rh eo b t a i n sap a y o ﬀ of 3/2, while
he would get at most 1 by deviating. The key diﬀerence with a subgame-perfect
equilibrium without observable mixed strategies is that Player 1 is not indiﬀerent
between the two actions U and D in equilibrium.
2.3 The backward program
For t =1 ,...,T− 1, ﬁx some correspondence Dt+1 : Ht ³ ∆(Γt+1(·)) that describes
equilibrium continuation paths following any history in Ht.T h i sd a t e - t continuation
correspondence is taken to be upper hemicontinuous and to have non-empty convex
and compact values.
We will need to merge continuation paths in Dt+1(Ht) with mixed actions of the
date-t consumer to obtain continuation paths for histories in Ht−1.A tam i n i m u m ,
the continuation paths following a history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 must be in:
PDt+1(ht−1)={µ : µ = ν ⊗ λ,ν ∈ ∆(At(ht−1)),λ(·|ct) ∈ Dt+1(ht−1,c t)}.
2Luttmer and Mariotti [10] use this example to construct a stochastic continuous game with
perfect information that has no subgame-perfect equilibrium in unobservable mixed strategies.
3This is the set of all probability distributions on Γt(ht−1) that are consistent with
marginals in ∆(At(ht−1)) and conditionals that map ct into Dt+1(ht−1,c t).
Lemma 1 PDt+1 : Ht−1 ³ ∆(Γt(·)) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence
with non-empty values that are convex and compact.
The proof of this lemma is implied by results in Mariotti [11] who builds on earlier
work by Simon and Zame [15] and Harris, Reny and Robson [6]. The convexity of
PDt+1(ht−1) follows from the assumed convexity of Dt+1(ht).
For each ht ∈ Ht, the utility of the date-t consumer from the worst possible






We let AMt(ht) denote the set of probabilities that attain this minimum. For each
ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, the date-t consumer can guarantee an approximate utility level of:









Clearly, the fact that PDt+1(ht−1) is convex implies that BDt+1(ht−1) is convex.
Lemma 2 Mt : Ht → R and Vt : Ht−1 → R are lower semicontinuous. Moreover,
BDt+1 : Ht−1 ³ ∆(Γt(·)) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-empty
values that are convex and compact.
The proof of this makes use of Lemma 1 and is otherwise standard.
2.4 The forward program
Recall that extended histories in e Ht consist of physical histories ht in Ht augmented
with the probability distributions over past actions whose support contains ht.F o r
any correspondence F deﬁned on Ht, we say that a function f deﬁned on e Ht is an
extended Borel measurable selection from F if f is Borel measurable and f(e ht) ∈
F(projHte ht). Extended measurable selections exist if measurable selections exist.
Lemma 3 Suppose dt is an extended Borel measurable selection from BDt+1.T h e n
there exists a Borel measurable function γt : e Ht−1 → ∆(Ct) a n da ne x t e n d e dB o r e l
measurable selection dt+1 from Dt+1 such that:
(i) γt is optimal for the date-t consumer given the continuation dt+1;
4(ii) dt(·|e ht−1)=
R
dt+1(·|e ht−1,c t,γt(·|e ht−1))dγt(ct|e ht−1).
Proof. Let ht−1 =p r o j Ht−1e ht−1 and γt(·|e ht−1) be the marginal of dt(·|e ht−1) over ∆(Ct).
By Lemma 12 of Harris, Reny and Robson [6], there exists a Borel measurable function
ν : e Ht−1 × Ct → ∆(Γt+1(Ht)) such that:
dt(·|e ht−1)=
Z
ν(·|e ht−1,c t)dγt(ct|e ht−1).
By deﬁnition of PDt+1(ht−1), ν(·|e ht−1,c t) is in Dt+1(ht−1,c t) for γt(·|e ht−1)-almost
every ct. One can therefore modify it on a set of measure zero to obtain a selection
from Dt+1. The Measurable Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and Border [1, Theorem
17.91]) guarantees that the correspondence AMt : Ht ³ ∆(Γt+1(·)) admits a Borel
measurable selection λ.D e ﬁne:
dt+1(·|e ht−1,c t,µ)=
(
ν(·|e ht−1,c t) if µ(·)=γt(·|e ht−1),
λ(·|ht−1,c t) if µ(·) 6= γt(·|e ht−1).
This construction makes dt+1 an extended measurable selection from Dt+1.T h e
deﬁnition of BDt+1 implies that if the date-t consumer randomizes according to γt,
then his utility will be:
Z
ut(ht−1,z)ddt(z|e ht−1) ≥ Vt(ht−1).
Alternatively, a deviation µ yields:
Z
ut(ht−1,c t,z)dλ(z|e ht−1,c t)dµ(ct)=
Z
Mt(ht−1,c t)dµ(ct) ≤ Vt(ht−1)
since λ is a selection from AMt. ¤
Notice that the observability of γt(·|e ht−1) is crucial for the construction of the continu-
ation path faced by the date-t consumer. Observability of mixed strategies also means
that the date-t consumer need not be indiﬀerent between actions ct ∈ At(ht−1) and
associated continuation paths in Dt+1(ht−1,c t) to be willing to randomize over these
actions. Indeed, failure to randomize in the prescribed way may trigger a punishment
in AMt(ht−1,c t).
2.5 Intrapersonal equilibria
The date-T consumer faces a simple decision problem. For each hT−1 in HT−1,d e ﬁne:





5By the Maximum Theorem, this deﬁnes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence
with non-empty, convex and compact values. Using this correspondence as the input
for the ﬁrst iteration of the backward program, we can deﬁne {Et}
T−1
t=1 recursively
via Et = BEt+1. Lemma 2 guarantees that the properties of ET are preserved by
successive applications of B. The forward program then allows one to construct
strategies that implement any path in E1(h0),f o ra n yh0 ∈ H0. Lemma 3 guarantees
that the resulting strategies form an intrapersonal equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The correspondence E1 : H0 ³ ∆(Γ1(·)) is upper hemicontinuous
and has non-empty values that are convex and compact. For every h0 ∈ H0,E 1(h0)
is the set of intrapersonal equilibrium paths given initial condition h0.
The proof of Proposition 1 relies on standard arguments, and is therefore omitted.
3 Competitive equilibrium
We consider an exchange economy with a single consumption good at each date
t =1 ,...,T in which consumers can trade in a sequence of markets for current
consumption. There are I types of consumers, indexed by i =1 ,...,I.F o r e a c h
type, there is a continuuum of consumers. For notational convenience, we take this
to be of unit measure for each type. Throughout, we assume that a law of large
numbers holds for each consumer type, in the following sense: if each consumer of
type i chooses a consumption vector according to some probability measure µi,t h e n
the aggregate consumption vector of consumers of type i is given by
R
cdµi(c).
3.1 Budget sets and preferences
The set of initial conditions H0 for the intrapersonal game of a consumer describes
prices and initial endowments. Speciﬁcally, write h0 =( p,e),w h e r ep is a vector
of prices and e is a vector of endowments. We take H0 to be some non-empty and
closed subset of ∆T × RT
++,w h e r e∆T ⊂ RT
++ is the simplex of strictly positive
prices for consumption at the T dates. The date-t consumer chooses a level of date-t
consumption subject to a budget constraint. Speciﬁcally, we take Ct = R+ and deﬁne
action correspondences as follows:
At(p,e,c1,...,c t−1)=
(









Since prices are strictly positive, it is clear that the action correspondence At is
continuous and compact-valued. Observe that for t<Twe do not let a date-t
consumer “throw away wealth:” what is not consumed is saved.3
3In inﬁnite-horizon versions of this type of intrapersonal game, it is possible to construct examples
of (pure strategy) intrapersonal equilibria in which consumers throw away current consumption
6The utility function for the date-t consumer is deﬁned over sequences of consump-
tion choices (c1,...,c T) ∈ RT
+.A c o n s u m e r t y p e i is deﬁn e db ya ne n d o w m e n tv e c t o r
ei ∈ RT
++ and a vector of continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
(Ui
1,...,Ui
T). Throughout, we maintain the following non-satiation assumption.
Assumption A For all i =1 ,...,I and t =1 ,...,T, the utility function Ui
t is
weakly increasing in consumption at all dates, and strictly increasing in ct,...,c T.
This assumption does not cover models of habit persistence in which past consumption
has a negative impact on current utility.
3.2 The excess demand correspondence
Under the above assumptions, the intrapersonal game for a consumer of type i has an
intrapersonal equilibrium for each (p,ei) ∈ ∆T ×RT
++. Fixing the endowment vector
of each type of consumer, we write Ei
1(p)=E1(p,ei) for the set of intrapersonal
equilibrium paths for a consumer of type i facing prices p ∈ ∆T.P r o p o s i t i o n 1
ensures that the correspondence Ei
1 : ∆T ³ ∆(RT
+) is upper hemicontinuous with
non-empty convex and compact values.
Suppose that consumers of type i all follow strategies that implement the path
µi(·|p) ∈ Ei
1(p). The aggregate consumption vector of consumers of type i is then R
cdµi(c|p). Under these symmetric strategies, the excess demand correspondence of












For each i =1 ,...,I, the excess demand correspondence ζ
i is bounded below by
−ei. It is convex-valued since Ei
1 is convex-valued. Moreover, ζ
i(p) is the image
of Ei
1(p) under the mapping µ 7→
R
(c − ei)dµ(c), which is continuous on compact
sets. The fact that Ei
1 is upper hemicontinuous therefore implies that ζ
i is upper













1(p) for each i =1 ,...,I
)
.
For each i =1 ,...,I, the strict monotonicity of the preferences of the date-T con-
sumer implies that p · c = p · ei for all c in the support of each path µi(·|p) ∈ Ei
1(p).
Hence, for any z ∈ ζ(p), one has:









Thus ζ satisﬁes Walras’ Law.
even though the preferences of every date-t consumer are strictly increasing in current and future
consumption.
73.3 The boundary behavior of demand
Our proof of existence of a competitive equilibrium is based on a theorem of De-
breu [2]. For this to apply, we need to check that ζ satisﬁes the following Bound-
ary Condition: if a sequence {pn} in ∆T converges to p ∈ ∂∆T, then the sequence
{infz∈ζ(pn) kzk} goes to +∞,w h e r ekzk =
PT
t=1 |zt|. One way to obtain this boundary
condition is the following assumption on preferences. Observe that the assumption
implies that utility must be bounded below.











where ui : R+ → R is continuous, concave, strictly increasing and unbounded above,




T are strictly positive.
This assumption covers the preferences proposed by Strotz [16] and Phelps and Pollak
[13], and used more recently by Laibson [7] and many others since. The preferences of
consumers of type i over future consumption sequences change over time whenever δ
i
k
is not an exponential function of k. For instance, in the widely used quasi-hyperbolic
speciﬁcation of Phelps and Pollak [13], δ
i




i)k for each k =
1,...,T − 1,w h e r eβ
i and δ
i are strictly positive. Preferences change over time
whenever β
i 6=1 .F o rd i ﬀerentiable utility functions, the marginal rate of substitution
between periods t+1and t+2is Dui(ct+1)/[δ
iDui(ct+2)] from the perspective of the
date-t consumer, while it is Dui(ct+1)/[β
iδ
iDui(ct+2)] from the perspective of the date-
t+1consumer. When β
i < 1, this describes a bias toward the present: nearby events
are discounted at a higher rate than events that occur in the distant future.
Lemma 4 Suppose that (Ui
1,...,Ui
T) satisﬁes Assumption B. If a sequence {pn} in
∆T converges to a price vector in ∂∆T, then the sequence {infz∈ζi(pn) kzk} goes to
+∞.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the game. Take T =2 .N o t et h a t
the date-1 consumer faces a standard decision problem. The result is then a direct
consequence of Debreu [2, Lemma 4] since the preferences of the date-1 consumer are
strictly increasing. Note in addition that the expected utility of the date-1 consumer
goes to +∞ as {pn} goes to p ∈ ∂∆T. Now suppose that the result is true for any
game of length T and suppose further that in any such game the expected utility of
the date-1 consumer goes to +∞ uniformly across intrapersonal equilibria as {pn}
converges to p ∈ ∂∆T. We want to show that the same is true for a game of length
T +1 .
Suppose ﬁrst that {pn
1} goes to zero. Then, since ui is bounded below and un-
bounded above, the date-1 consumer can guarantee for himself a utility of +∞ in the
8limit by spending all his wealth on current consumption, irrespective of the behavior
of his successors. This implies that the expected utility of the date-1 consumer must
















































which implies the desired boundary behavior.
Suppose alternatively that {pn
1} is bounded away from zero and some other price
goes to zero. If infz∈ζi(pn) kzk is bounded away from +∞, then the above inequalities
imply that there must be a sequence of intrapersonal equilibria along which expected
date-1 utility remains bounded. But this cannot be part of an optimal strategy for
the date-1 consumer. To see this, note that the induction hypothesis implies that
along this same sequence of intrapersonal equilibria the amount of nominal wealth
left by the date-1 consumer to the date-2 consumer must go to 0. If instead the
date-1 consumer were leaving nominal wealth ε > 0 to the date-2 consumer, then the
induction hypothesis would imply that the utility of the date-2 consumer would go
to +∞ uniformly across intrapersonal equilibria along the considered price sequence.









uniformly across equilibrium continuation paths µi,n
ε ∈ ∆(Γ2(pn,e i,(pnei − ε)/pn
1))
that follow when the date-1 consumer leaves nominal wealth ε > 0 to the date-2
consumer. This implies that the date-1 consumer could guarantee for himself inﬁnite
utility in the limit, a contradiction. ¤
We can now state and prove our main result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (Ui
1,...,Ui
T) satisﬁes Assumption B for at least one
i =1 ,...,I. Then there exists a competitive equilibrium in which consumers of the
same type follow the same strategies.
Proof. By the previous results, the excess demand correspondence ζ is convex-valued,
bounded below and upper hemicontinuous. Moreover it satisﬁes Walras’ Law and the
9Boundary Condition. Hence, by Theorem 8 in Debreu [2], there exists p∗ ∈ ∆T such
that 0 ∈ ζ(p∗), which implies the result. ¤
The arguments given in the proof of Lemma 4 do not rely on the convexity of the
individual excess demand correspondences. An analogue of Proposition 2 can there-
fore be proved for intrapersonal equilibria in pure strategies. The aggregate demand
c o r r e s p o n d e n c ef o rc o n s u m e r so fag i v e nt y p ei sm a d ec o n v e xb ya s s i g n i n gd i ﬀerent
strategies to diﬀerent consumers of the same type. As pointed out earlier, these
pure-strategy intrapersonal equilibria exist by the results of Harris [4].
We use the convexity of the individual demand correspondences to construct a
symmetric competitive equilibrium. In economies in which preferences do not change,
situations in which the demand correspondence is not a singleton arise only when
a consumer is indiﬀerent between several choices. Convexity of preferences then
implies that the demand correspondence must have convex values. Here, it is typically
not true that the date-t consumer is indiﬀerent between the various elements of the
subgame-perfect equilibrium correspondence at time t.
4 Concluding remarks
We have used certain assumptions about preferences to guarantee that a competitive
equilibrium exists when preferences change over time. Our assumptions about pref-
erences are no doubt more restrictive than needed. Further research is required to
determine the extent to which they can be weakened.
Equilibria that are symmetric in the sense that consumers of the same type follow
the same strategies exist if consumers can make their current behavior depend on past
randomized behavior. This ensures convexity of the correspondence of intrapersonal
equilibria. We use this convexity as part of a classic existence proof along the lines
of Debreu [2]. It may be the case that the intrapersonal equilibrium correspondence
has suﬃcient regularity to allow us to do without this convexity. We could then show
the existence of a competitive equilibrium without having to assume that there is a
continuum of consumers of every type.
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Figure 1. Non-convexity of the subgame-perfect equilibrium correspondence